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in Pharmaceuticals 
Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
The purpose of this paper is to measure productivity growth over time and to 
compare productivity levels cross-nationally for the pharmaceutical industry 
in four major European markets and the United States. The pharmaceutical 
industry raises interesting issues for productivity measurement. The product 
mix includes thousands of different compounds, and the range available differs 
significantly across countries and over time. Research and development (R&D) 
is a very important input and determinant of productivity; however, the stock 
of  R&D capital cannot be measured accurately because of  inadequate data, 
long and variable lags between investments and product launch, and interna- 
tional spillovers. The high rate of technological change leads to potential bias 
in measuring price change. For example, Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett (1993) 
and Berndt and Greenberg (1996) show that the U.S. PPI for drugs has been 
seriously upwardly biased owing to delay in incorporating new drugs; Gril- 
iches and Cockburn (1996) illustrate the bias from treating generics as new 
drugs rather than as new forms of old drugs. 
Measurement of  price change and real productivity growth is complicated 
in many European countries by  the fact that drug prices are regulated, either 
directly (France and Italy) or indirectly (the United Kingdom). Consequently, 
trends in drug prices over time deviate significantly from economywide price 
inflation, and these trends differ across countries (Danzon and Kim  1996). 
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Regulation, nontariff barriers to trade,  and other factors induce significant 
prices differences for the same drugs across countries, after conversion at ei- 
ther exchange rates or GDP purchasing power parities (PPPs). This paper dem- 
onstrates the sensitivity of  estimates of  country-specific productivity growth 
to the price indexes used to deflate nominal expenditure data. Similarly, the 
adjustment for cross-national price differences affects the estimates of cross- 
national productivity differences. 
A second purpose of  this paper is to show the effects of  price regulation 
on input use and productivity and the implications of such regulation-induced 
distortions on the estimation of  productivity growth. The price regulatory 
schemes in several European countries are designed to promote domestic em- 
ployment and investment in addition to their primary purpose of controlling 
drug expenditures.' For example, France and Italy grant higher prices for prod- 
ucts that are produced locally. The United Kingdom regulates the rate of return 
on capital invested in the United Kingdom, and the allowed rate of return for 
a firm depends on its contribution to the U.K. economy. Regulation that grants 
higher prices for use of certain inputs tends to distort resource allocation (Av- 
erch and Johnson 1962), leading to excessive costs and suboptimal productiv- 
ity. We  show that, with input-distorting regulation, factor shares are biased 
proxies for output elasticities in measuring growth in multifactor productivity. 
Our empirical analysis uses data for the pharmaceutical industry from the 
OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database, for France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and the United States for the period  1970-90.* In order to 
distinguish the effects of regulation from other factors that may contribute to 
cross-national productivity differences, we compare pharmaceuticals to other 
industries (chemicals and total manufacturing) that are not subject to the same 
regulatory constraints. We  report country-specific estimates of  productivity 
growth using three country-specific price indexes: the GDP deflator, the offi- 
cial pharmaceutical PPI, and a Divisia price index constructed from IMS data 
(Danzon and Kim 1996)'  For cross-national comparison of productivity lev- 
els, we report results both with GDP PPPs and with a drugs-specific Fisher 
price index (Danzon and Kim 1998) that is based on prices for all matching 
drugs in the countries under comparison. 
The findings demonstrate that estimates of  country-specific productivity 
growth and cross-national comparisons are very sensitive to the price indexes 
used and that none is perfect. At minimum, these findings confirm the impor- 
tance of using industry-specific price indexes for productivity measurement in 
an industry that is subject to heavy price regulation, such as pharmaceuticals. 
1. The transparency rules of  the European Union in principle constrain regulatory bias toward 
local firms,  but, in practice, price setting for medical services has remained an area of national dis- 
cretion. 
2. Germany in this paper refers to the former Federal Republic of Germany. 
3. IMS International is a market research firm that collects data on pharmaceutical sales. 373  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
With these caveats, the empirical results are generally consistent with the hy- 
pothesized effect, that biased price regulation has increased input use and re- 
duced productivity in France. For the United Kingdom, pharmaceutical pro- 
ductivity is high, relative to other U.K. manufacturing and relative to other 
European pharmaceutical industries, despite the United Kingdom’s biased reg- 
ulatory system. 
Note that the productivity measures analyzed here are GDP-based measures 
of  value added for all firms operating in each country, including local subsidi- 
aries of multinational firms, since this corresponds to the scope of regulation. 
These GDP-based measures do not reflect productivity in the discovery of in- 
novative new drugs. Innovation in R&D is a critical component of the overall 
productivity of a particular country’s pharmaceutical industry but is beyond the 
scope of  this paper.4 However, our results suggest that both the level and the 
returns to unobserved R&D capital are lower in  France than in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. This is generally consistent with other evi- 
dence, that France has lagged the United States and the United Kingdom in 
pharmaceutical innovation (Barral 1995). 
In this paper, section 13.1 briefly describes the regulatory regimes and their 
expected effects. Section 13.2 discusses measurement issues in cross-national 
comparisons of  productivity for pharmaceuticals. Section 13.3 describes the 
data and methods used in this study. Section 13.4 compares within-country 
growth rates  and  cross-national levels of  productivity for pharmaceuticals, 
compared to other manufacturing. Section 13.5 reports estimates of total factor 
productivity growth. Section 13.6 concludes. 
13.1  Forms of Price Regulation and Previous Literature 
We selected France, Italy, and the United Kingdom as examples of countries 
with biased regulation. Germany and the United States provide a benchmark 
of productivity in countries where price constraints are neutral with respect to 
location of production. The four European countries have similar populations 
and  similar opportunities for export within the European Union (EU). Al- 
though the U.S. market is much larger than the domestic market of any single 
European country, the total EU market represents larger total sales volume than 
the U.S. market. Thus, opportunities to exploit economies of scale should be 
similar, absent regulatory inducements for domestic production and/or barriers 
to exports. 
4.  Comanor (1965) and Cocks (1973, 1981) analyze productivity in R&D, focusing on effects 
of  safety  and  efficacy regulation  (see also Peltzman  1973; and  Thomas  1990, 1992,  1996). 
Hancher (1990) describes the regulatory systems in France and the United Kingdom. 374  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
13.1.1  Forms of Price Regulation 
Biased Price Regulation: France and Italy 
France and Italy regulate the manufacturer’s price as a condition of  reim- 
bursement by the social insurance program. The criteria used for setting prices 
have included costs, therapeutic merit, and international comparisons. Con- 
tribution to the local economy is widely acknowledged to be  a bargaining 
strategy for a higher price, notwithstanding the Treaty of Rome and other non- 
discrimination provisions of  the European Union  (see, e.g., Burstall  1991; 
Burstall and Reuben 1988). 
Price regulation that favors domestic production is more likely to be a bind- 
ing constraint on multinational firms than on domestic firms that would volun- 
tarily locate a larger fraction of their operations in the home country. Domestic 
firms are therefore predicted to command a larger market share in countries 
with biased price regulation, other things equal. 
Rate-of-Return Regulation: The United Kingdom 
The U.K. pharmaceutical price regulation system (PPRS) regulates the rate 
of return on capital by  comparing net revenues generated from sales to the 
National Health Service (NHS) to capital that contributes to sales to the NHS. 
Within this constraint, manufacturers can set prices freely for individual new 
products. Prices of generics are regulated. Simple rate-of-return regulation is 
predicted to induce substitution of capital for labor (Averch and Johnson 1962). 
However, this tendency is mitigated because the permitted return that each firm 
negotiates with the PPRS depends, within the range of 17-21  percent, on such 
factors as number of jobs created, innovation, and other contributions to the 
U.K. economy. 
In general, the U.K.  system favors domestic firms that would in any case 
locate corporate headquarters, R&D, and other overhead capital in the United 
Kingdom. The PPRS may  also create incentives for multinationals to shift 
facilities to the United Kingdom from other countries if the permitted return is 
increasing in exports or if joint costs can be allocated to the U.K. rate base. 
Reference Price Reimbursement: Germany 
Prior to 1989, Germany permitted free pricing of  drugs. Political concern 
over the level and growth of drug expenditures led manufacturers to adopt a 
voluntary price freeze from 1984 to 1989. In 1989, the government introduced 
a reference price system of  reimbursement, focused initially on off-patent 
drugs.5  Although this system constrains prices for relatively high-priced (usu- 
ally originator) drugs, it is formally neutral with respect to input mix and loca- 
5. Products are grouped on the basis of  similarity of  therapeutic effect, and all products in a 
group are reimbursed at a common reference price. The patient must pay any excess of  the manu- 
facturer’s price over the reference price. In practice, most manufacturers have dropped their prices 
to the reference price level (Remit 1991; Danzon and Liu 1996). 375  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
tion of production, except that it indirectly favors low-priced drugs, which are 
typically generics produced by  local firms. Since this system was phased in 
gradually starting in September 1989, our data are too early to show full ef- 
fects. Our data also do not show the effects of the much more stringent controls 
adopted in 1993.6 
“Free” Pricing: The United States 
Pharmaceutical firms may set prices freely in the United States, subject to 
market constraints. Since the late 1980s, managed care has expanded rapidly 
to pharmacy benefits, through health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and 
pharmacy benefit management companies (PBMs) that manage drug benefits 
for indemnity plans. Pharmacy benefit management has accelerated the growth 
in generic market share and led brand manufacturers to discount their drugs to 
managed care purchasers. Since 1990, Medicaid and other public programs 
demand similar discounts. These initiatives are neutral with respect to manu- 
facturer or country of  origin, except to the extent that they favor generics, 
which are usually locally produced. 
One potential distortion in the United States is the possessions tax credit, 
which reduces corporate tax rates based on employment and income generated 
in Puerto Rico.’ To show the effects of this tax incentive, we report results with 
and without Puerto Rico for the years with available data. 
13.1.2  Previous Literature 
Most previous cross-national comparisons of productivity are at the one- or 
two-digit SIC level (e.g., van Ark and Pilat 1993). The Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics (BLS) publishes international comparisons of  growth rates for two-digit 
industries but does not compare productivity levels. Since pharmaceuticals are 
a small fraction of chemicals and allied products (SIC 28), these analyses shed 
little light on pharmaceuticals. Cocks (1974, 1981) provides detailed estimates 
of total factor productivity growth for a single firm in the United States. 
The only existing international comparison of productivity in pharmaceuti- 
cals is Burstall and Reuben’s (1988) study of potential savings from plant con- 
solidation in the European Community. Using industry interviews and OECD 
data for 1985, Burstall and Reuben conclude that scale economies in primary 
production (active ingredients) had already been realized since most multi- 
national firms operate primary plants in only one or two locations. However, 
secondary production (processing and packaging) was extremely decentral- 
6. The 1993 controls included a price cut and a global limit on drug expenditures, with physi- 
cians at risk for exceeding the drug budget. This led to significant volume reduction and substitu- 
tion toward cheaper drugs (Danzon and Liu 1996). 
7. Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1976, provides a tax credit equal to the 
federal tax liability on certain income earned in Puerto Rico. This was modified in 1982. The tax 
credit affects incentives to locate primary production of  active ingredients in herto  Rico since the 
value of R&D is realized as the value added to the raw ingredients. The mix  of labor and capital 
within the production process should be unaffected. 376  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
ized, with many plants operating below capacity. Industry interviews attributed 
this in part to government pressure. Burstall and Reuben estimated that half to 
two-thirds of these plants could be closed.8 Their cross-national productivity 
comparisons are based on GDP PPPs. Thus, the question remains how much 
of any apparent cross-national differences in productivity in fact simply reflect 
price differences. Their study also did not attempt to model or estimate the 
effects of regulation on country-specific productivity growth. 
13.2  Theory and Measurement Issues with Biased Regulation 
13.2.1  Incentive Effects of Biased Regulation 
Biased regulation that grants higher output prices as a reward for local pro- 
duction creates incentives for the pharmaceutical firm to deviate from cost- 
minimizing input levels. Consider a firm that produces output Q with two vari- 
able inputs, labor L and capital K, and a technology-related fixed input M, 
subject to the production function Q(L, K, M) and constant factor prices, w, 
and wK.  With biased regulation, output price P(L,  K;  M)  is increasing in domes- 
tic employment of L and K with Px, > 0, PX,,,,  5  0, X, = L, K.  For simplicity, 
assume that  Q is independent of  P.9 The firm selects L and K  to maximize 
profits R: 
(1)  R  =  P(L, K; M)Q(L, K; M) - W, - w,. 
Taking first-order conditions for an interior maximum, and rearranging, 
(2)  PdQldX,  =  W,  - dP/dX,Q,  X, =  L,  K. 
Equation (2) differs from the standard first-order condition owing to the last 
term, which reflects the distorting effect of biased regulation. Thus, employ- 
ment is expanded beyond the cost-minimizing level; this increase is greater 
the more responsive is the regulated price to increases in local employment 
or investment. 
In a global context with trade, the net effect of regulatory bias depends on 
the costs to multinational corporations of  shifting operations between coun- 
tries. If multinationals can costlessly shift production from countries with neu- 
tral or no regulation to countries with biased regulation that favors domestic 
production, the location of  production is affected, but productivity and costs 
8. Burstall and Reuben estimated the potential savings at only 3.5-4.5  percent of the total labor 
force. They concluded that value added per employee was relatively high in pharmaceuticals com- 
pared to manufacturing as a whole in France, contrary to the conclusions reached here. 
9. This may be a reasonable assumption for the countries with price regulation for the period 
under study. Patient cost sharing was minimal in France and Italy owing to exemptions and supple- 
mentary insurance. In the United Kingdom, roughly 80 percent of scripts are exempt from cost 
sharing; for the remaining patients, cost sharing is a fixed amount per script, independent of the 
price of the drug. 377  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
would be unaffected. Capital investment, employment, and exports would in- 
crease in countries with biased price regulation, with an offsetting decrease in 
neutral countries.I0 
However, if  shifting production between countries is costly, for example, 
owing to nontariff barriers to trade"  or regulatory demands in multiple coun- 
tries, then the profit-maximizing strategy subject to regulation may be to oper- 
ate an excessive number of plants at suboptimal scale or suboptimal capacity 
utilization. The effect on capitamabor ratios depends on the costs and political 
returns to increasing capital and labor, respectively. Even if capitalflabor ratios 
are unaffected, both labor productivity and multifactor productivity are pre- 
dicted to be lower if biased regulation induces the firm to forgo economies of 
scale or scope. 
13.2.2  Productivity Measurement 
Consider the simple production relation 
(3) 
where Q is real output, Xis a vector of real input flows, including labor, capital, 
energy, etc., t indicates time period, and A is an index of multifactor productiv- 
ity that reflects technology, unmeasured management skill, organization, and 
other factors. Productivity growth can be estimated from the dynamic version 
of equation (3). Under assumptions of perfect competition in output and input 
markets, Hicks neutral technical change, and constant returns to  scale, the 
growth in multifactor productivity (MFP) is equal to the difference between 
the growth in output and the growth in the weighted sum of inputs: 
(4)  A =  Q - cg,xt, 
where g, = d In Q/d In Xt is the output elasticity of input i, and . denotes the 
percentage time derivative of a variable. To obtain empirical estimates of out- 
put elasticities g,, a common assumption is that firms are in competitive, long- 
run equilibrium. The first-order conditions for profit maximization imply 
(5)  dQldX,  =  YIP, 
where wz  is the price of the ith input, and P is the final output price. Substituting 
in (4), MFP is estimated as the residual: 
10. In practice, until recently most trade has been in active ingredients, whereas each country's 
processing and packaging was done locally. This suggests greater economies of scale in primary 
production of active ingredients, which partly reflects the costs of compliance with environmental 
and safety requirements. 
11. During the period analyzed here, each country retained a separate system of market approval 
for prescription drugs. Although the European Union has explicitly authorized so-called parallel 
importing of approved drugs and this does increasingly constrain price differences within the Eu- 
ropean Union, nontariff barriers to imports have been significant until recently. 378  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
(4’)  A =  Q - zsix,, 
where the observable factor revenue share si  = wiXi/PQ  is used as a proxy for 
the unobserved output elasticity gi for factor i. In long-run equilibrium with 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, Csi = 1. This implies that 
unobservable service flows from quasi-fixed inputs are proportional to-and 
hence can be measured by-observable  stocks, and one unobservable factor 
share can be estimated as a residual. 
The measure of MFP obtained using factor share approximations for output 
elasticities is inaccurate if firms are not in long-run, cost-minimizing equilib- 
rium (Berndt and Fuss 1986)12  or if firms have market power such that prices 
exceed marginal cost (Hall 1988, 1990). For pharmaceutical firms, the latter 
condition almost certainly applies: pricing at short-run marginal cost would 
not pay a normal return on sunk investments in R&D and so cannot be a sus- 
tainable equilibrium. 
Biased regulation is an additional reason why observed factor shares provide 
a potentially biased measure of output elasticities in the pharmaceutical indus- 
try. To illustrate, write equation (2) in elasticity form: 
or 
(2”) 
From equation (29,  the measured factor share is equal to the output elasticity 
plus the elasticity of the regulated price with respect to input levels. Thus, the 
assumption commonly used in productivity measurement, that factor shares 
serve as a proxy for output elasticities, does not hold under biased regulation. 
In addition, the existence of unobserved sunk investments in R&D capital, 
M,  leads to bias in the standard procedure of estimating the share of physical 
capital as the residual, after subtracting the share of measured inputs. Assume 
that investments in M are committed before the regulatory regime is known 
and that variable inputs are adjusted to the regulatory regime, as in equation 
(2). Define the ex ante expected shadow user cost of M as 
Z:  =  P*Q,(L*,  K”), 
where * denotes expected, optimized values in the absence of regulation. The 
ex post realized shadow user cost of  M  depends on politically constrained 
prices and variable factor inputs: 
(7)  Z,  =  P(L, K; M)Q,(L,  K; M). 
12. Under nonconstant returns to scale, long-run equilibrium is defined as output at the point of 
tangency between the SRAC and the LRAC curves. 379  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
By definition, the ex post factor shares, including the ex post return to the quasi- 
fixed factor, sum to one: 
(8)  s,  +  SK +  s,  =  1 
or 
(8')  1 - s,  =  SK  +  s,. 
Thus, if the unobserved share of physical capital is estimated as the comple- 
ment of the labor share 1 -  s,,  the resulting estimate iK  is upwardly biased for 
the true value sK;  the upward bias is greater the greater the unobserved invest- 
ment in M and the greater its ex post return, 2,.  However, this upward bias in 
iK is partially offset if  the elasticity of  regulated price with respect to labor 
is positive: 
(9)  .?,  =  S,  +  S,  =  1 - i,  =  1 - EQL - EpL. 
From equations (8) and (2"): 
(10)  s,  =  1 -  (SL +  s,), 
Thus, the more elastic is the regulated price with respect to variable inputs, 
EP,,,, the lower will be the observed ex post return to the quasi-fixed factor. Of 
course, investments in fixed factors will not be made in the long run if realized 
returns are systematically below expected returns. But products that are devel- 
oped by  innovative pharmaceutical R&D are diffused worldwide; hence, the 
incentives for R&D depend on global revenues. The returns to unobserved in- 
tangible capital can thus differ significantly across countries. In particular, a 
country that is small relative to the global market can pay a less than competi- 
tive or even zero return 2,  on the global R&D of  multinational companies 
without affecting the supply of  drugs, as long as it pays prices sufficient to 
cover its country-specific marginal costs. 
13.3  Data and Methodology 
13.3.1  Data 
The data on outputs and input levels used here are from the OECD Structural 
Analysis (STAN) database (1994), described in appendix A, which also lists 
other sources. The STAN  data are generally national accounts compatible. 
Where national accounts data were not available, STAN substitutes survey- 
based data. Since definitions for these survey data are not necessarily national 
accounts compatible, consistency across countries is not  assured; however, 380  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
within-country trends should be con~istent.'~  We  report within-country trends 
over time and cross-national comparisons of input levels and productivity. The 
cross-national comparisons should provide the best tests of the hypothesized 
effects of regulation. In addition, under the plausible assumption that regula- 
tion has become more stringent over the period studied, particularly in France 
and the United Kingdom, the differences in trends across countries may also 
provide  evidence on  the  effects of  regulation, assuming other factors un- 
changed. 
The measure of productivity in this database is value added, defined as gross 
output minus the cost of materials, energy, supplies, and some contract work. 
Labor is reported as number of employees, unadjusted for hours worked, skill, 
age distribution, etc. The measure of capital is gross fixed capital formation. 
We apply a perpetual inventory calculation to estimate the stock of capital and 
assume that the flow of  capital services is proportional to the stock.I4 Other 
inputs, such as contracted business services, advertising, licensing and royalty 
fees, etc., are reflected in value added. These data thus do not permit a gross 
production approach to productivity measurement. The potential bias from not 
netting out these intermediate inputs should not be great if they are competi- 
tively supplied. Data sources and definitions are described in more detail in 
appendixes A and B. 
13.3.2  Data Limitations 
Ideally, productivity measurement and comparison across countries would 
be based on a homogeneous set of  products, with product-specific price in- 
dexes and quality-adjusted measures of all inputs. In that case, cross-national 
productivity differences for pharmaceuticals, relative to other manufacturing, 
would provide a pure measure of the effects of pharmaceutical regulation, after 
controlling for other country-specific  factors that affect all industries in a coun- 
try, such as management skills. 
The available data on outputs, prices, and inputs deviate from these ideal 
conditions in ways that may influence the productivity estimates. This section 
outlines the main data limitations that should be borne in mind in interpreting 
the empirical findings. 
13. For the United States, STAN reports the aggregate of SICS 2833-2836.  Of these, pharma- 
ceutical preparations account for 82 percent of total value of shipments. The remainder includes 
medicinals and botanicals, diagnostic substances, and biological products (1987 Census of Manu- 
facturing, ind. ser. table la-1). 
14. The capital stock in year r is estimated as K, = (1 -  d)K,_, + /,  and K, = (l/d)/l+3,  where 
is the mean of gross investment in the first three years with reported data. The results reported 
here assume a uniform ten-year life of capital. We  also made estimates based on the country- 
specific depreciation rates for equipment and structures reported in Bemdt and Hesse (1986), as- 
suming a weight of 0.66 for equipment and 0.37 for structures. For SIC 2383, depreciation charges 
were 7.8 percent of gross book value of depreciable assets in 1987 (Census of Manufacturing, 
table 3b), which implies a 12.8-year life of capital in steady state. Cocks (1974) assumes a fifteen- 
year life for equipment. 381  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
Heterogeneous Product Mix 
Pharmaceutical markets in all countries comprise thousands of compounds, 
ranging from some truly global products, which are marketed in all major mar- 
kets of the world, to purely local products that are marketed in only one coun- 
try. Each product is available in a range of dosage forms, strengths, and pack 
sizes that change over time and differ across countries. The extent of  global 
diffusion of a drug is a commonly used measure of its therapeutic value (e.g., 
Barral 1995) because manufacturers have incentives to launch a drug in any 
country where it could pass regulatory requirements for safety and efficacy 
and generate revenues sufficient to cover the country-specific marginal costs. 
In 1992, products that were marketed in seven major markets of the world 
accounted for over two-thirds of  sales in the United States, the United King- 
dom, and Canada but less than 50 percent of sales in France, Germany, Italy, 
and Japan.15 The diffusion of  global products, either through outlicensing to 
local firms or direct marketing through  multinational subsidiaries, implies 
common technologies across markets at least for those products. However, be- 
cause the key technologies of  pharmaceuticals are product specific and are 
protected by patents, technology does not diffuse throughout the industry un- 
til patent expiration. Thus, cross-country differences in product mix in phar- 
maceuticals are likely to imply cross-national differences in available technol- 
ogy. These differences are likely to be greater the greater the share of local 
products. 
Local products include herbal, homeopathic, and other medicines that typi- 
cally have  less research content than global products. These local products 
complicate productivity measurement in part because differences in research 
content and production technologies may imply differences in true productiv- 
ity and in price-marginal cost margins. In addition, regulation-induced ineffi- 
ciencies may  be different for local products that are produced by  domestic 
firms than for global products produced by  multinationals. Estimates of  the 
effects of regulation may therefore be influenced by the market share of local 
products. Third,  since local  products  are  necessarily omitted from  cross- 
national price indexes, these indexes yield a biased measure of overall relative 
price levels if  regulation is more stringently applied to global than to local 
products.  l6 
Countries also differ in the market share of generic versions of originator 
products and in the share of over-the-counter (OTC) versus prescription-bound 
(Rx) sales. The available data include all pharmaceutical products, including 
originator, generics, Rx, and OTC products; thus, separate estimates based 
solely on global products cannot be made. The markup of price over short-run 
15. The market share of local products reflects insurance coverage and medical norms as well 
16. Systematic bias is plausible, even aside from regulatory favoring of local companies, if 
as regulatory requirements for proof of efficacy. 
regulation focuses on high-priced products and global products have relatively high prices. 
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marginal cost is generally higher for research-based originator drugs than for 
generics, which incur minimal research or promotional expense. The mar- 
ketwide average measure of value added should therefore be higher in coun- 
tries with low generic market shares, ceteris paribus. Of the countries studied 
here, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany all have large ge- 
neric market shares (over 30 percent of prescriptions), whereas generics are a 
negligible share in France and Italy. However, the low generic presence in these 
markets partly reflects lack of incentive for generic entry because of low price- 
cost margins on originator drugs by the time of patent expiration. Thus, on net, 
the expected sign of the correlation between generic market share and average 
value added marketwide is theoretically indeterminate. 
Operations Mix 
The functions undertaken by  a pharmaceutical firm-R&D,  primary pro- 
duction of the active ingredients, secondary processing and packaging, promo- 
tion and distribution-have  very different input requirements. Functional mix 
may  differ across countries, reflecting product mix and other real factors, in 
addition to possible reporting differences with respect to administrative per- 
s0nne1.l~  Such differences cannot be identified in the data and may contribute 
to the observed productivity differences.  ** Countries with relatively numerous 
primary production plants are expected to have relatively high value added 
because these primary production plants have low costs of bulk chemical in- 
puts but the output is valued at transfer prices that reflect the intangible value 
of the embodied R&D.I9  Value added is expected to be much lower in the more 
numerous plants for processing and packaging, for which the transfer price of 
the active ingredient is an input cost. 
Drug promotion has traditionally been predominantly through highly labor 
intensive detailing of  individual physicians. Differences in optimal detailing 
effort therefore could affect observed levels of labor inputs and laborkapital 
ratios.2o  However, in a simple model of  optimal promotion effort, sales force 
is increasing in the operating margin per unit sold and in the demand elasticity 
17. We thank Ernie Bemdt for noting this possibility of inconsistent reporting of central admin- 
istrative and office personnel. 
18. For the United States in 1987, production workers accounted for 46 percent of total employ- 
ees and 35 percent of payroll. As a percentage of value of shipments, cost of materials, payroll, 
and new capital expenditures were 26 percent,  13 percent,  and 4.7 percent, respectively (U.S. 
Census of Manufacturers, data for SIC 2833). 
19. Multinational companies generally locate primary production of each compound in only 
one or two plants worldwide, with location generally determined by tax considerations. The output 
(transfer) price may be constrained by rules governing transfer pricing, including the price realized 
in the country of first launch. More generally, the value-added data used here may be contaminated 
by tax-induced transfers of profits across countries. This applies to all industries. Hence, compari- 
sons between pharmaceuticals and other industries should be unbiased if the extent of such trans- 
fers is similar across industries. 
20. Detailing entails frequent visits to individual physicians by sales personnel, to provide infor- 
mation and product samples. 383  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
with respect to detailing effort. Thus, if regulation depresses operating mar- 
gins, it should decrease labor inputs to promotion, other things equal. The U.K. 
regulatory system specifically limits the expenditure on promotion that can be 
included in the rate base. 
Unobserved lid  D 
Investment in R&D as a percentage of sales is higher for pharmaceuticals 
than for any other industry (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1994). How- 
ever, R&D stocks cannot be accurately estimated from the available data. The 
OECD-STAN data for labor and capital presumably include R&D inputs em- 
ployed in in-house research facilities. However, R&D inputs are not identified 
separately and would in any case provide an incomplete measure of R&D in- 
vestments. Omitted are payments to contractors engaged in clinical trials, li- 
cense fees and royalties for compounds licensed from abroad, and public in- 
vestments in R&D, which are a substitute for in-house research. 
Estimates of  R&D spending obtained from pharmaceutical trade associa- 
tions’ surveys of their members are reported here. These data should include 
payments to outside contractors but omit expenditures by  nonmember firms, 
nonrespondents to the surveys, and public R&D expenditures. Expenditures 
on labor and capital are not reported separately. Thus, neither these trade- 
association data nor the OECD-STAN data provide a comprehensive, country- 
specific measure of R&D investment flows. 
Even if country-specific investments in R&D could be accurately measured, 
conversion to a stock of knowledge available in each country, by year, would 
be problematic because of lags and international spillovers. The lag between 
initial investment in a target compound and final regulatory approval of a new 
drug averages about twelve years in the United States (DiMasi, Bryant, and 
Lasagna 1991). This cannot be extrapolated to other countries because of dif- 
ferences in product mix and regulatory systems. More generally, the interna- 
tional diffusion of  knowledge through global products, sold under license or 
through multinational subsidiaries, severs any close link between a country’s 
domestic R&D expenditure, the cumulative stock of knowledge in that country, 
and the technology underlying the production process. For these reasons, we 
do not attempt to construct a country-specific measure of  R&D stock.*]  We 
discuss the effects of unobserved R&D stocks below. 
13.3.3  Price Indexes 
Country-Specific InjZation 
Accurate measurement of real productivity growth requires accurate price 
indexes to convert the value-added data from current to constant local currency 
units. Price indexes for pharmaceuticals can diverge significantly from those 
21. Cocks (1974) develops methods to estimate R&D stocks for a single firm in a single country. 384  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
for other goods and services because of regulation, insurance (which insulates 
consumers from price levels), and nontariff trade barriers. The country-specific 
GDP deflator reflects economywide inflation and hence can be interpreted as 
a measure of the opportunity cost of drug expenditures. We  use the GDP de- 
flators to deflate all inputs-labor,  capital, and R&D expenditures-under  the 
assumption that inputs are purchased in economywide markets. The GDP de- 
flators are also used to adjust output measures for the nonpharmaceutical man- 
ufacturing industry. 
For pharmaceutical output, we report results using the GDP deflator and two 
pharmaceutical price indexes.  The ideal index would measure the rate  of 
change of a quality-constant, representative basket of drugs sold through all 
relevant outlets since the expenditure data include both prescription and non- 
prescription drugs sold through retail pharmacies, hospitals, and other outlets. 
Given the rapid rate of technical change, the ideal index should use continually 
updated weights. The official PPIs for drugs may be imperfect because of lags 
in incorporating new products, inappropriate methods of  incorporating new 
forms of old compounds, use of list rather than transactions prices, and nonrep- 
resentative sampling. The US.  PPI-drugs was upwardly biased by as much as 
50 percent during the late 1980s (Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett 1993),  primar- 
ily because of delay in incorporating new products. Similar or other biases may 
be present in the PPIs for other countries (Danzon and Kim 1996).  For France, 
a national accounts price index for drugs is available only from 1988. For the 
prior years, we use a weighted average of manufacturer price indexes for reim- 
bursable and nonreimbursable drugs reported in SNIP (1993).22 
Our Divisia pharmaceutical price indexes are based on IMS data for pre- 
scription and nonprescription products sold through retail pharmacies. They 
incorporate new  compounds in  their  second year  on  the  market  through 
chained weights. These indexes nevertheless provide an imperfect deflator for 
total pharmaceutical output because the indexes exclude sales through hospi- 
tals, mail order, supermarkets, and other outlets, they exclude multimolecule 
drugs, and they exclude discounts; hence, they may overstate the growth in net 
manufacturer prices in the United States. 
Defining a unit of pharmaceutical output is problematic because of the large 
and continually changing range of  compounds, forms, strengths, and pack 
sizes. For the Divisia indexes used here, the unit of observation is the average 
price per standard unit for a specific molecule. A standard unit is defined by 
IMS as one tablet, one capsule, five milliliters of  a liquid, etc. It is a rough 
proxy for a dose and has the advantage that it is defined for all dosage forms, 
packs, etc. such that the indexes can be based on the universe of data. This 
measure implicitly assumes that all forms of a given molecule are perfect sub- 
stitutes. To the extent that generics are in fact imperfect substitutes for origina- 
22. These indexes presumably pertain only to outpatient drug sales. Hospital prices are not 
regulated in France and so may differ from outpatient prices. For the other countries, it is unclear 
whether the indexes include both prescription drugs and OTC sales and whether hospital sales 
are included. 385  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
tor drugs, these indexes understate price growth and overstate productivity 
growth; but, to the extent that line extensions and other new forms of old com- 
pounds offer real quality improvements, price growth is overstated and produc- 
tivity growth downwardly biased.23 
These three indexes are reported in table 13.1 for the years for which all 
three are available. For all countries except the United States, pharmaceutical 
prices declined in real terms. The PPI and Divisia indexes are more similar to 
each other than to the GDP deflator and, on theoretical grounds, are likely to 
be more accurate. The subsequent discussion focuses on the drugs-specific in- 
dexes. 
Cross-National Comparisons 
For currency conversion for cross-national comparisons, we use GDP PPPs 
for all input prices and for nonpharmaceutical output. Since GDP PPPs reflect 
consumer prices rather than producer prices, they are not ideal for comparing 
productivity at manufacturer prices but are probably the best available measure 
for the nonpharmaceutical manufacturing sector. However, for pharmaceuti- 
cals, conversion at GDP PPPs can lead to systematic bias owing to regulation 
of manufacturer prices and other factors. 
For  the  cross-national comparisons of  pharmaceutical productivity,  we 
therefore also report results using a drugs-specific Fisher price index for the 
years 1981-91  based on IMS data at manufacturer price levels. For each coun- 
try compared to the United States, these indexes include all compounds that 
are available in both countries (see app. B below; and Danzon and Kim 1998). 
Because these indexes necessarily omit nonmatching (local) drugs, they may 
be biased if prices for matching drugs, which include the global products pro- 
duced by multinational corporations, differ systematically  from prices for non- 
matching local products." 
We do not use the medical care PPPs or the pharmaceuticals PPPs reported 
by the OECD because both have severe limitations for productivity compari- 
sons. The medical PPPs, like the GDP PPPs, are intended to measure consumer 
price levels, whereas our output data are at manufacturer prices. Because gov- 
ernment expenditures are excluded from the medical PPPs, they may be seri- 
ously biased as a measure of  average price levels in countries where govern- 
ments account for the majority of medical expenditures and may pay different 
prices from retail consumer prices. 
Moreover, because many  medical services are not reimbursed on a fee- 
for-service basis, the reported prices may not correspond even to list prices- 
for example, hospitals were paid global budgets in France, Germany, and the 
23. These indexes are described in more detail in app. B and in Danzon and Kim (1996), which 
reports molecule and product indexes, using fixed weights and chained (Divisia)  weights. Compar- 
isons between these indexes, the official PPI-drugs, and the OECD price indexes for pharmaceuti- 
cals are also discussed. 
24. Danzon and Kim (1998) compare price indexes constructed using IMS data to the OECD 
medical PPPs and GDP PPPs. Table 13.1  Measures of Pharmaceutical Price Idation (1980 = 100) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
France" 
GDP price indexb 
Divisia price indexc 
PPI-drugsd 
Germany' 
GDP price indexb 
Divisia price index' 
PPI-drugsd 
Italy' 
GDP price indexb 
Divisia price index' 
PPI-drugsd 
United Kingdom8 
GDP price indexb 
Divisia price index' 
United Statesh 
GDP price indexb 
















































136.8  146.7  155.3  163.5  168.5  173.8  179.8  185.2  191.0 
117.4  124.1  128.8  133.6  138.2  142.8  146.9  149.0  149.7 
121.9  126.6  129.4  131.7  134.1  135.1  135.1  136.7  137.9 
112.4  114.8  117.4  121.2  123.6  125.6  128.8  133.2  138.7 
112.4  116.6  117.6  118.7  118.4  118.1  118.0  115.3  116.0 
112.3  116.1  119.6  121.4  122.4  123.8  125.9  126.2  128.0 
160.4  179.1  194.9  210.3  222.8  237.6  252.4  271.3  291.0 
145.4  157.5  170.3  184.0  191.4  199.0  202.5  205.7  216.7 
156.6  166.6  189.5  190.2  210.5  219.3  223.0  227.3  238.0 
126.2  131.9  139.5  144.4  151.6  161.5  172.9  183.8  196.2 
120.1  121.2  123.3  125.5  130.6  135.9  141.0  142.9  143.5 
121.0  124.8  131.4  128.5  134.2  135.9  136.8  141.4  144.7 
121.6  127.0  131.6  135.1  139.5  144.9  151.3  157.9  164.2 
137.8  151.5  161.8  172.8  182.1  191.8  206.7  227.9  247.0 
128.0  137.9  149.1  160.9  172.9  185.2  200.6  214.7  229.2 
"SNIP (1993). 
bFrom OECD HEALTH DATA (CREDES). 
c1980  base imputed from average growth rates from 1981-82  and 1982-83.  From Danzon and Kim (1996)  using IMS data. See app. B. 
dFor  Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the 1980  base imputed from the average for 1981-82  and 1982-83.  1981 index imputed from growth rate for June- 
December 1981.  1980  index imputed from the growth rate for June 1981-December 1982. 
'Preise und Preisindizesfur gewerbliche Produkre, Statistisches Bundesamt. 
'Eollettino mensile di srarisrica, Istitute Nazionale di Statistica. 
gAnnunl Abstract of  Statistics, Central Statistical Office, H.M.  Stationery Office, London. 
"Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Index, http://www.bls.gov/ppihome.htm. 387  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
United Kingdom during much of this period, physicians in the United King- 
dom are paid either a salary or a capitation per enrolled patient, etc. Even 
where physicians are paid fee for service, as in Germany, the duration and 
content of  a “visit” tends to be reduced as the prices are reduced and may 
also change owing to technological change. Estimating an accurate, quality- 
constant price index is particularly difficult in medical care because of  the 
rapid rate of technical change and hence in the real content of  services that do 
not change in name. For example, the real content of  a hospital day is very 
different today than twenty years ago, but this quality change is typically em- 
bedded in the reported measure of price change.25 
In the case of the pharmaceutical PPPs, the sample is very small; retail prices 
may differ significantly from manufacturer prices;26  the index is unweighted; 
it includes medical devices; and it includes imputed values where prices are 
unavailable, which is inappropriate if unavailability reflects systematic differ- 
ences between the unavailable products and the available products, owing to 
preferences and regulation. The differences between the OECD PPPs and our 
pharmaceutical indexes based on IMS data are discussed further in Danzon 
and Kim (1998). 
The Fisher indexes for the United States relative to each comparison country 
are reported in table 13.2. They show the differences that remain in pharma- 
ceutical prices after converting at exchange rates. Prices are lowest in France 
and decline steadily for most of the period, consistent with the hypothesis of 
increasing regulatory stringency. Italy has the second lowest prices, with con- 
siderable variation over the period that reflects exchange rate fluctuations as 
well changing regulatory stringency. The United Kingdom is third lowest and 
also shows declining prices over time, relative to the United States, which 
again suggests increasing regulatory stringency in the United Kingdom. Ger- 
many’s prices decline, relative to the United States, following the introduction 
of reference pricing in 1989. 
These data indicate that regulation has constrained the level and growth of 
drug prices at the manufacturer level relative to the unregulated U.S. prices. 
This confirms the importance of using sector-specific prices indexes for cross- 
national comparisons of a heavily regulated industry such as pharmaceuticals. 
Note that the estimates of U.S. price levels and growth are upwardly biased 
owing to the omission of  discounts to managed care and public purchasers, 
which increased during the late 1980s and 1990~.~~ 
25. Cutler et al. (1996) discuss the upward bias in the U.S. CPI for medical care, relative to a 
true cost-of-living index. 
26. Distribution margins account for up to half of purchaser price levels for pharmaceuticals in 
some European countries (Healy 1995). 
27. The Fisher indexes conceal significant differences between the U.S.-weighted Laspeyres 
indexes and the foreign-weighted Paasche indexes. The Laspeyres indexes show Germany, Can- 
ada, and Japan with higher prices than the United States. The Paasche indexes show foreign prices 
uniformly lower than U.S. prices, by as much as 50  percentage points (see Danzon and Kim 1998; 
Danzon and Chao 1999). Table 13.2  U.S. Relative to Foreign Prices for Pharmaceuticals,  Fisher Price Indexes," Single Molecule Products, Retail Pharmacy: Matching by 
Molecule/ Therapeutic Category 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985b  1986  1987b  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
France  1.66  1.84  2.13  2.52  2.38  2.24  2.35  2.46  2.81  2.68  2.65  2.06 
Italy  1.84  2.11  2.06  2.39  2.21  2.04  2.00  1.95  2.25  2.13  1.93  1.79 
United Kingdom  1.04  1.20  1.41  1.67  1.68  1.68  1.54  1.39  1.56  1.66  1.66  1.71 
Germany  .87  .99  1.09  1.26  1.24  1.23  1.18  1.13  1.42  1.39  1.35  1.44 
"IMS data. See Danzon and Kim (1998). 
b1985  and 1987 values were estimated by taking the average of 1984 + 1986 and 1986 + 1988, respectively. 389  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
13.4  Empirical Results 
13.4.1  Pharmaceutical Production 
In all countries, growth in production of pharmaceuticals has far outpaced 
total manufacturing in the 1980s, regardless of  the price index used  (table 
13.3). Using the Divisia indexes, pharmaceutical production increased  170 
percent in Italy, 90 percent in France, 96 percent in the United Kingdom, 55 
percent in Germany, and 18 percent in the United States. Relative to this bench- 
mark, the estimates based  on  the GDP deflator are downwardly biased by 
40-50  percentage points for France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, but the 
U.S. estimate is upwardly biased by 52 percentage points. The slow growth in 
Germany, relative to the other European countries, supports the hypothesis that 
production has been diverted from Germany to countries whose regulatory en- 
vironments specifically reward local production, such as France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom. 
13.4.2  Employment 
Between 1980 and 1990, employment in pharmaceuticals grew almost three 
times as rapidly in France (15.8 percent) as in the United States (5.8 percent) 
and the United Kingdom (3.5 percent) (table 13.4). By  1990, pharmaceutical 
employment was  2.0 percent of  total manufacturing employment in France, 
compared to 1.4 percent in the United Kingdom, 1.2 percent in Germany, 1.3 
percent in Italy, and 0.95 percent in the United States excluding Puerto Rico. 
Although this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that regulation has 
stimulated employment in France and the United Kingdom since production 
has also grown rapidly in France, the alternative  hypothesis of demand-driven 
expansion of production and sales force cannot be dismissed without evidence 
on productivity. Whether the growth in pharmaceutical employment is a net 
gain, as intended by industrial policy, or simply a diversion from other sectors 
remains an open question. 
13.4.3  Value Added 
Trends in value added are similar to trends in total production, with much 
more rapid growth in pharmaceuticals than in other manufacturing industries 
(table 13.5).  Again, results are very sensitive to the price index. 
To provide a measure that is independent of  the price index, we calculated 
the cumulative growth in value added relative to the cumulative growth in pro- 
duction between 1980 and 1990. This ratio is 0.58 in Italy and 0.87 in France; 
by contrast, the ratio is 1.06 in the United States, 1.12 in the United Kingdom, 
and 1.13 in Germany. Thus, the ratio of value added to output declined in coun- 
tries with strict price regulation but increased in the other three countries.  This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that biased price regulation reduced the rate 
of growth of productivity. Table 13.3  Growth in Production, 1970-W  (GDP deflator adjusted values unless noted; 1980 = 100) 
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244.2 United Kingdom 
Total manufacturingb 
Chemical productsb 
Drugs & medicinesb 





Drugs & medicinesb 
Divisia price index 
PPI-drugs 
96.2  105.2 
65.9  94.5 
88.5  85.8 
...  ... 
71.1  80.6 
49.8  67.5 





















89.6  91.4 
90.4  94.0 
104.3  106.2 
110.7  111.6 
108.2  110.8 
90.1  92.0 
91.0  88.8 
105.5  113.0 
99.6  99.8 





















94.8  101.3  104.8  106.7 
84.8  101.7  99.8  102.6 
125.6  135.3  144.8  150.3 
144.6  157.1  172.1  184.3 
141.2  152.9  172.1  190.0 
93.4  96.0  100.2  102.1 
74.2  79.0  82.5  84.8 
127.2  140.2  151.3  161.7 
99.4  107.4  114.3  118.4 











“Production  is national accounts compatible (gross output). 
bSurvey-based  data may not be national accounts compatible. 
“Figures  are estimated using the ratio of  Drugs and Medicines to Other Chemicals for the closest year for which data are available. Table 13.4  Growth in Number of Employees, 1975-90  (1980 = 100) 



















































96.8  95.5 
97.2  95.4 
102.4  102.9 
98.2  95.3 
99.3  98.6 
101.4  102.7 
96.4  93.9 
93.4  90.2 
99.8  99.2 
89.9  84.8 
90.6  86.4 
95.2  93.5 
99.7  92.3 
101.3  96.5 
98.3  96.0 
93.6  90.7 
93.0  92.1 
104.2  105.6 
92.1  91.7 
96.7  97.7 
102.9  104.6 
90.2  86.1 
88.1  86.4 
96.7  98.8 
80.0  78.8 
82.0  82.6 
92.6  92.7 
90.9  95.6 
95.3  98.7 
97.1  96.5 
88.1  86.4 
90.8  90.6 
106.8  107.8 
92.9  94.3 
99.7  101.7 
104.5  107.1 
85.0  84.5 
86.2  88.3 
97.0  97.9 
78.5  76.7 
82.4  81.2 
91.4  92.7 
94.7  93.6 
98.2  96.9 
94.8  96.0 
84.2  82.8  83.1  83.5 
89.7  89.5  91.0  92.0 
107.2  108.6  112.2  115.8 
94.4  94.2  95.6  98.3 
103.3  105.4  106.0  109.2 
107.7  109.2  108.4  113.4 
83.7  84.8  85.2  85.2 
91.0  92.9  94.1  94.5 
99.4  103.2  104.2b  104.2b 
76.2  77.3  77.8  77.6 
81.7  84.1  85.5  85.7 
103.5  98.7  104.1  96.8 
94.0  96.0  96.3  95.0 
100.0  102.2  103.5  104.4 
99.4  101.2  106.4  105.8 
aSurvey-based data may not be national accounts compatible. 
bFigures are estimated using the ratio of Drugs and Medicines to Other Chemicals for the closest year for which data are available. Table 13.5  Growth of Value Added, 1970-!MP  (GDP deflator adjusted values unless noted; 1980 = 100) 
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(continued) Table 13.5  (continued) 
1970  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
United Kingdom 
Totalmanufacturing  100.8  101.1  100.0  91.3  91.7  91.7  92.1  97.3  101.1  101.9  106.6  108.9  106.2 
Chemical products  81.4  96.7  100.0  89.4  90.6  95.2  100.7  106.8  114.4  118.7  124.1  127.6  124.6 
Drugs & medicinesb  75.2  75.3  100.0  96.4  106.8  106.7  115.7  121.2  129.6  146.1  159.4  164.9  170.0 
Divisia price index  ...  . . .  100.0  101.0  113.4  112.2  125.9  137.1  149.2  169.6  189.4  202.2  218.7 
PPI-drugs  ...  .  . .  100.0  100.4  110.8  111.3  122.3  128.6  145.7  165.0  189.4  208.5  221.0 
United States 
Total manufacturing  88.3  89.4  100.0  100.7  93.6  96.7  104.5  103.3  104.6  105.4  109.0  109.1  106.0 
Chemical products  84.9  91.8  100.0  105.8  106.3  113.3  118.7  116.6  125.8  126.9  139.0  139.7  140.2 
Drugs &medicinesb  77.5  86.6  100.0  100.3  107.8  118.1  120.1  128.0  133.9  149.6  158.7  168.3  179.5 
Divisia price index  ...  . . .  100.0  99.1  101.8  104.2  100.6  104.0  104.7  114.6  119.9  123.2  124.4 
PPI-drugs  ...  . . .  100.0  101.2  107.6  112.2  110.6  112.9  112.4  120.7  124.2  127.0  132.0 
Walue added is national accounts compatible value added. 
bSurvey-based data may not be national accounts compatible. 
<Figures  are estimated using the ratio of Drugs and Medicines to Other Chemicals for the closest year for which data are available. 395  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
13.4.4  Value Added per Employee 
The results for value-added per employee (table 13.6) again depend criti- 
cally on the price index. The estimates based on the GDP deflator imply that 
labor productivity growth in France has been 50 percent lower in pharmaceuti- 
cals than in total manufacturing, despite (or because of) the more rapid growth 
in employment in pharmaceuticals than in total manufacturing. A similar pat- 
tern holds for Italy. By contrast, for the United Kingdom, Germany, and the 
United States, labor productivity growth in pharmaceuticals appears to have 
outpaced total manufacturing. 
However, using either the PPI-drugs or the Divisia indexes increases the 
estimates of  labor productivity growth for all countries except the United 
States, reflecting the decline in real drug price over time in all countries except 
the United States. With these indexes, labor productivity growth is roughly 
twice as high in the United Kingdom as in France, Germany, and Italy, which 
are similar. The United States lags the other four countries for pharmaceuticals, 
as it does for total manufacturing. These results seem inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that increasingly stringent price regulation in France and Italy has 
generated increased distortions of productivity over time. A possible confound- 
ing factor-and  a plausible explanation for the apparently inconsistent re- 
sults-is  that the market share of global drugs has increased over time, relative 
to  local drugs. Assuming that productivity is absolutely higher for global 
drugs, an increasing market share of  global drugs in France and Italy could 
bias upward the estimates of productivity growth for each sector separately.28 
Tables 13.7 and  13.8, which compare labor productivity levels relative to 
the United States, illustrate the sensitivity of international comparisons to the 
conversion index. Converting at GDP PPPs (table 13.7), value added per em- 
ployee in pharmaceuticals is more than twice as high in the United States as in 
all European countries. Adding Puerto Rico to the United States widens the 
gap by 3-4  percentage points. Of the European countries, the United Kingdom 
leads with value added per employee of 47 percent of the United States, fol- 
lowed by  Germany 33.2 percent, Italy 28.7 percent, and France 19.8 percent. 
This shortfall of labor productivity in Europe relative to the United States is 
much greater in pharmaceuticals than for total manufacturing, for which the 
1990 figures are 92.7 percent for France, 79.4 percent for Italy, 77.2 percent 
for Germany, and 62.6 percent for the United Kingdom. 
However, because the low estimates of labor productivity for pharmaceuti- 
cals in Europe relative to the United States partly reflect the lower prices in 
Europe (see table 13.2), table 13.8 reports labor productivity, relative to the 
United States, with all countries adjusted to U.S. price levels using the pharma- 
28. Market shares of global and local drugs over time are not available. However, the decline in 
the number of pharmaceutical companies operating in France, from 507 in 1970 to 353 in 1991, 
is consistent with a declining market share of local products. In 1989, French companies accounted 
for 48 percent of sales (SNIP 1993). Table 13.6  Growth of Value Added per Employee, 1970-90" (GDP deflator adjusted values unless noted; 1980 = 100) 
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"Value Added is national accounts compatible value added. 
bEmployment figures are survey-based data and may not be national accounts compatible. 
'Figures are estimated using the ratio of Drugs and Medicines to Other Chemicals for the closest year for which data are available. Table 13.7  Value Added per Employee relative to United States, GDP PPP Conversiona  (United States = 100) 




Drugs & medicinesb 






Drugs & medicines 
Drugs & medicines 
(including Puerto 
Rico) 
70.5  71.7  79.4  78.5  79.3  76.9  76.1  79.9  81.9  82.7  87.5  90.5  92.7 
46.6  45.7  63.2  62.5  53.5  53.4  48.1  48.6  47.8  49.0  49.8  51.5  53.4 
...  23.2  29.8  29.5  26.2  26.5  23.7  21.7  22.9  22.3  21.8  20.4  19.8 
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ..  23.7  ...  20.5 
63.9  66.3  73.3  72.3  72.3  72.3  72.0  74.3  74.3  72.1  74.1  75.1  77.2 
43.7  48.1  45.7  59.4  49.8  51.4  49.1  48.8  49.0  45.2  46.9  48.2  46.2 
...  363  42.7  43.6  39.5  39.7  38.2  36.2  37.1  32.8  33.4  36.8  33.2 
...  ...  35.8  ...  ...  ...  ...  30.1  ... 
(continued) Table 13.7  (continued) 
1970  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Italy 
Total manufacturing  60.8  64.0  76.6  75.8  75.2  71.7  73.8  76.3  75.3  76.7  78.4  80.3  79.4 
Other chemicals  56.7  48.5  65.9  56.2  50.1  46.3  50.2  54.1  46.1  47.5  48.7  52.6  46.9 
Drugs & medicines 
(including Puerto 
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  30.5  Rico)  ...  ...  36.0  ... 
Drugs &  ...  39.9’  43.7  42.9  39.8  39.1  39.0  38.4  34.7  33.1  31.4  33.2’  28.7“ 
...  ...  ... 
United Kingdom 
Total manufacturing  47.1  48.6  51.6  51.5  54.3  55.5  54.1  57.5  60.4  60.9  62.5  63.0  62.6 
Other chemicals  27.7  29.4  37.1  34.4  32.5  31.5  32.5  34.7  34.9  35.0  36.3  36.4  35.2 
Drugs & medicinesb,d  37.0  41.3  49.1  48.4  49.3  46.5  48.3  47.4  48.7  48.7  50.4  48.6  47.0 
Drugs & medicines 
(including herto 
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  44.8  Rico)  ...  ...  ...  ...  44.6  ... 
Calculated using GDP PPPs. 
bSurvey-based employment data may not be national accounts compatible. 
‘Figures are estimated using the ratio of drugs and medicines to chemicals for the closest year for which data are available. 
dSurvey-based value-added data may not be national accounts compatible. Table 13.8  Value Added per Employee relative to United States, Fisher Price Indexes"  (United States = 100) 
1981  1982  1982b  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1987b  1988  1989  1990 
Drugs & Medicines 
France'  50.7  43.5  39.3  46.3  44.2  38.0  50.2  59.2  54.4  60.5  60.1  64.2 
Germany  39.2  37.1  33.5  38.7  37.8  34.0  46.7  47.3  43.5  46.1  58.6  59.6 
Ita1yC.d  61.2  60.4  54.7  57.1  61.3  54.4  60.8  67.3  61.9  63.6"  74.8"  72.5" 
United  52.3  55.0  49.7  52.6  58.1  56.2  66.2  68.9  63.3  71.3  73.3  83.6 
United Statesc.d  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
"For Fisher price indexes, see table 13.2, app. B below, and Danzon and Kim (1998). 
bFigures in these columns use the United States and herto  Rico as base. 
%rvey-based  employment data may not be national accounts compatible. 
dSurvey-based value added may not be national accounts compatible. 
'Figures are estimated using the ratio of drugs and medicines to chemicals for the closest year for which data are available. 400  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
ceuticals-specific Fisher indexes. Although this dramatically improves the Eu- 
ropean productivity measures, Germany is still only 60 percent of the United 
States, France 64 percent, Italy 73 percent, and the United Kingdom 84 per- 
cent. All countries except the United Kingdom still show lower productivity 
for pharmaceuticals than for total manufacturing. This may understate the pro- 
ductivity shortfall in pharmaceuticals because of the exclusion of local prod- 
ucts from these Fisher indexes. If  local products, which are produced by local 
firms and have relatively low prices, are less stringently regulated than global 
products that are produced by  multinational corporations and are generally 
higher priced, then the Fisher indexes understate foreign prices and overstate 
foreign productivity, relative to the United States. 
For the United States, the OECD data exclude Puerto Rico, which accounted 
for roughly 14 percent of U.S. production and 9 percent of employment in the 
1980s.  Adding Puerto Rico (where available) raises U.S. value added by about 
3 percentage points (1987 data), as expected given the tax incentives to locate 
high-value-added operations in Puerto Rico. 
Note that, for purposes of comparing productivity cross-nationally, pricing 
the output of different countries at a common price level is appropriate. The 
table  13.8 estimates, with  all countries compared at U.S. prices using  the 
Fisher indexes, therefore provide a more accurate comparison of labor produc- 
tivity in pharmaceuticals than the table 13.7 estimates that use GDP PPPS.~~ 
However, for purposes of evaluating the efficiency of  resource allocation to 
drugs relative  to  other  sectors within  each  country, each country's  output 
should be valued at local prices; thus, for this purpose, the table 13.7 compari- 
sons that  use local prices and GDP PPP conversion are more appropriate. 
These show significantly lower labor productivity in pharmaceuticals than in 
other manufacturing in France and Italy, yet employment has grown more rap- 
idly in pharmaceuticals than in other manufacturing in these countries. We 
return to this below. 
13.4.5  Capital Investment 
Between  1980 and  1990, fixed capital investment in pharmaceuticals in- 
creased 150 percent30  in France, compared to roughly 60 percent in the United 
States and the United Kingdom and compared to 33 percent for total manufac- 
turing in France (table 13.9). Investment per employee increased 116 percent 
in pharmaceuticals in France, compared to 59 percent in total manufacturing 
(table 13.10), consistent with the hypothesis of biased regulation. The more 
29. The use of the United States as the benchmark price level does not affect the results because 
the Fisher indexes are the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, which, respec- 
tively, use consumption patterns in the United States and the foreign country as weights. Ideally, 
inputs should also be measured at common price levels. This adjustment cannot be made with the 
available data. 
30. The 1990 figure of 250 appears to be above trend; the three-year average for 1989-91  is 
237. Using this lower figure would not affect the conclusions. Table 13.9  Growth in Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1975-90” (GDP deflator adjusted values; 1980 = 100) 
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80.9  71.9  75.6 
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69.2  72.8  80.6 




























96.0  73.9  85.3 
113.5  80.0  80.5 



















“Gross fixed capital formation is national accountsxompatible gross fixed capital formation (land, buildings, machinery, and equipment). 
bSurvey-based data may not be national accounts compatible. Table 13.10  Growth in Gross Fixed Capital Formation per Employee (GDP deflator adjusted values: 1980 = 100) 





















78.5  100.0 
75.4  100.0 
...  100.0 
96.4  92.6  91.1 
93.9  85.9  82.7 
111.5  137.5  126.0 
94.9  107.2  113.3 
78.9  93.8  94.6 













76.1  100.0 
99.5  100.0 
...  100.0 
95.9  89.6  93.4 
98.3  91.1  91.7 
104.2  97.7  108.8 
92.4  103.8  109.2 
87.9  96.0  103.6 













86.8  100.0 
201.1  100.0 
...  ... 
92.5  86.1  79.7 
92.2  88.8  82.9 
...  ...  ... 
87.7  81.9  83.1 
89.3  90.5  84.8 









...  ... 
88.8  100.0 
85.7  100.0 
84.4  100.0 
85.4  87.8  92.4 
82.8  80.1  88.7 
119.2  99.5  102.1 
111.3  128.3  122.1 
97.7  121.7  116.0 













84.1  100.0 
105.3  100.0 
88.6  100 
106.5  104.0  81.3 
109.2  117.5  83.9 
107.9  123.9  112 
89.2  98.7  85.7 
81.6  85.8  70.3 













"Survey-based data may not be national accounts compatible. 
bErnployment  figures are survey-based  data and may not be national accounts compatible. 403  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
rapid growth in labor productivity in the French pharmaceutical industry rela- 
tive to other French manufacturing (measured using the Divisia indexes) may 
thus in part reflect the increasing capitaVlabor ratio. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the United Kingdom also experienced more rapid 
growth in capital investment, both absolutely and per employee, in pharmaceu- 
ticals than in total manufacturing, consistent with the predicted effects of rate- 
of-return regulation. The growth in capitaVlabor ratios may have contributed 
to the growth in value added per employee in pharmaceuticals relative to total 
manufacturing (64 vs. 37 percent) in the United Kingdom. 
Lower capital/labor ratios in France and Germany may contribute to their 
lower labor productivity relative to the United  States in   pharmaceutical^.^' 
Capital formation per  employee in  pharmaceuticals, relative to the United 
States, is 57 percent for France, 49 percent for Germany, and 99 percent for 
the United Kingdom (table 13.11). By contrast, capital formation per employee 
for total manufacturing relative to the United States is 125 percent in France, 
84 percent in Germany, and only 65 percent in the United Kingdom. For Ger- 
many, whereas capital formation per employee in total manufacturing has in- 
creased relative to the United States (from 61 percent in 1975 to 84 percent in 
1990), for pharmaceuticals the trend is reversed, dropping from 79 percent of 
the U.S. level in 1975 to 40 percent in  1988 and 49 percent in 1989. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that pharmaceutical investments have 
been diverted from Germany to other European Union countries. 
13.4.6  R&D 
Table 13.12 reports estimates of R&D expenditures, using survey data from 
pharmaceutical trade  associations (Centre for  Medicines  Research  1993). 
R&D expenditures in constant local currency units have grown most rapidly 
in the United States, both absolutely and relative to labor, and most slowly in 
Germany since the mid-1980s. R&D investment per employee is roughly twice 
as high in the United States as in other countries (table 13.12, panel C).  As 
noted earlier, country-specific R&D stocks cannot be directly calculated from 
R&D investment flows because of lags in launch and international diffusion. 
However, assuming that R&D stocks are positively correlated with investment 
flows, these data suggest that stocks of unobserved R&D capital are significant 
and are probably larger in the United States than in other countries. 
13.5  Multifactor Productivity Growth 
Estimates of  multifactor productivity growth require measures of  output 
elasticities. As discussed earlier, the conventional use of factor shares as prox- 
31. We compare capital formation rather than the estimated capital stock per employee because 
the capital stock estimates depend on the assumed life of capital for which we have no accurate 
data. With our base-case assumption of a ten-year life of capital in all countries, the capital forma- 
tion and capital stock estimates are highly correlated. Table 13.11  Gross Fixed Capital Formation per Employee, 1975-90,  Relative to the United States"  (GDP PPP conversion; United States = 100) 
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"Gross fixed capital formation is national accounts-compatible gross fixed capital formation (land, buildings, machinery, and equipment). 
bFigures  are survey-based data and may not be national accounts compatible. 
bEmployment  figures are survey-based data and may not be national accounts compatible. Table 13.12  Growth in Drugs and Medicines R&D 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 












R&D per employee, relative 






100.0  111.2  120.9  133.9  149.8  154.2  176.0  184.0  203.5  218.3  201.6 
100.0  102.5  119.0  139.9  165.1  168.8  159.6  150.9  158.1  174.5  188.2 
100.0  106.0  108.3  107.1  124.5  130.6  149.7  169.2  194.8  208.6  217.6 
100.0  105.6  119.9  131.2  143.6  156.9  155.5  184.2  200.8  210.1  220.6 
100.0  114.8  129.8  139.5  153.2  171.6  194.0  217.3  239.9  254.4  276.2 
100.0  110.6  118.7  129.8  143.6  146.5  168.1  173.4  185.6  192.9  181.0 
100.0  101.1  117.3  135.5  160.1  159.7  150.2  140.0  147.8  155.9  161.7 
100.0  106.7  111.8  108.3  128.2  133.1  150.4  163.7  186.7  199.8  ... 
100.0  107.5  123.2  134.7  149.6  161.0  152.9  177.7  183.6  193.2  ... 
100.0  117.6  131.3  142.1  158.8  175.7  191.8  211.1  221.6  236.4  ... 
63.2  59.4  57.0  57.3  56.6  52.1  54.7  51.3  52.2  50.8  ... 
77.4  66.3  69.0  73.3  77.5  69.9  60.1  50.9  51.2  50.7  ... 
49.3  44.7  41.9  37.4  39.5  37.0  38.2  37.8  41.1  41.1  ... 
66.6  60.5  62.8  62.4  62.1  60.8  52.9  56.3  54.9  54.2  ... 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  ... 
"R&D data from national trade associations (Center for Research in Medicines 1993). 
'GDP  deflator adjusted values; 1981 = 100. 
'Number of employees for France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States are survey-based data and may not be national accounts compatible. 
dGDP  PPP conversion; United States = 100. 406  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
ies for output elasticities for pharmaceuticals is potentially biased for several 
reasons. First, patent protection could lead to prices that exceed long-run mar- 
ginal cost (including a competitive return to R&D), in which case factor shares 
of revenue or value added would be downwardly biased estimates of  output 
elasticities (Hall 1988, 1990).  On the other hand, if regulation constrains prices 
below long-run marginal cost, revenue-based factor shares will exceed output 
elasticities. Second, factor shares are upwardly biased measures of output elas- 
ticities for labor or physical capital if price regulation induces excessive factor 
inputs (see eq. [2”]). Third, if the output elasticity for physical capital is esti- 
mated as the complement of the labor share, this estimate will be upward bi- 
ased since it includes the unmeasured returns to the stock of intangible R&D 
capital, and MFP growth will be downward biased. Assume that there is no 
bias in prices, that both the stock of  intangible capital M  and its return s,  are 
unobserved, and that s,  is estimated as 1 -  sL.  In that case, the Solow residual 
reflects conventional TFP plus the contribution of this unobserved input: 
Q- s,L-  SKK =  A+  SMM. 
Since R&D investments are the main source of technical change in this indus- 
try, distinguishing between production function shifts due to A and M  is con- 
ceptually problematic as well as infeasible given the data. 
To illustrate the severity of potential measurement bias, table 13.13 reports 
revenue-based and cost-based estimates of factor shares for labor and physical 
capital. Labor share s,  is labor compensation divided by  either value added 
(revenue based) or estimated total variable cost (cost based). The first estimate 
of the share of capital sK is a residual income measure (1 -  sL  ). The second 
estimate of s,  is a cost-based estimate of the rental cost of capital, (p + 6)K. 
The real cost of funds p is assumed to be 10 percent, and the depreciation rate 
8 is also assumed to be 10 percent, assuming a ten-year life of capital.32 
The revenue-based factor shares imply a much larger share of  labor in 
France (71-92  percent, depending on the price deflator for value added), com- 
pared to 23-29  percent for the labor share in the United States, 30-36  percent 
in the United Kingdom, and 43 percent in Germany. The cost-based estimates 
are much closer, ranging from 82 percent in the United States to 86 percent 
in France. The two alternative estimates of  s,  are fairly similar for France. 
However, for other countries, the residual income measure of  s,  exceeds the 
rental cost measure; for the United States, this difference is greatest (77 vs. 
5 percent). The difference presumably reflects the ex post return to unob- 
served R&D capital and other unmeasured services, including contractual pay- 
ments for R&D services and license fees that are appropriately subsumed into 
32. Strictly, the rental price of capital reflects tax offsets as well as the real cost of funds and 
the depreciation rate (Hall  1990). Since we  lack countryspecific data on tax offsets, these are 
ignored here. Myers and Shyam-Sunder (1996) estimate beta of  roughly one and a real cost of 
capital of  9.9-10.7  percent for the period 1980-90.  This is consistent with previous estimates 
(Grabowski and Vernon 1990). Table 13.13  Share of Labor and Capital 
Value-Added-Based Shares  Cost-Based Sharesd 
Labor Share (sL)*  Capital Share (s~,)~  Capital Share (s&  Share of Labor (SJ  Share of Capital (sd' 














Drugs & medicines 
P  P  I  -  d  ru  g  s 
.66  .69  .62  .34  .3 1  .38  .26  .27  .26  .72  .72  .70  .28  .28  .30 
.46  .5 1  .44  .54  .49  .56  .29  .31  .27  .62  .62  .62  .38  .38  .38 
.94  .94  .92  .06  .06  .08  .12  .19  .20  .88  .83  .82  .12  .17  .I8 
...  34  .7 1  ...  .16  .29  ...  .17  .16  ...  .83  .82  ...  .17  .18 
.66  .69  .67  .34  .3 1  .33  .21  .22  .2 1  .76  .76  .76  .24  .24  .24 
so  .54  .55  SO  .46  .45  .24  .23  .22  .68  .70  .71  .32  .30  .29 
.48  .46  .43  .52  .54  57  .20  .18  .16  .70  .72  .73  .30  .28  .27 
...  .46  .43  ...  .54  .57  ...  .18  .16  ...  .72  .73  ...  .28  .27 
.60  .51  .54  .40  .43  .46  .37  .37  .34  .62  .61  .62  .38  .39  .38 
.64  .58  .55  .36  .42  .45  .93  .I5  .52  .41  .43  .52  .59  .57  .48 
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
(continued) Table 13.13  (continued) 
Value-Added-Based Shares  Cost-Based Sharesd 
Labor Share (sL)'  Capital Share (sJ'  Capital Share (s~)~  Share of Labor (s~)~  Share of Capital (s~)~ 









Drugs & medicines 
PPI-drugs 
.78  .77  .72  .22  .23  .28  .25  .27  .24  .76  .74  .75  .24  .26  .25 
.72  .7 1  .66  .28  .29  .34  .44  .46  .37  .62  .6 1  .64  .38  .39  .36 
.36  .38  .36  .64  .62  .64  .19  .20  .I8  .65  .66  .67  .35  .34  .33 
...  .36  .30  ...  .64  .70  ...  .19  .15  ...  .66  .67  ...  .34  .33 
.71  .72  .68  .29  .28  .32  .2 1  .23  .22  .77  .75  .76  .23  .25  .24 
.59  .57  .50  .41  .43  .50  .a  .37  .29  .60  .61  .63  .40  .39  .37 
.30  .27  .23  .70  .73  .77  .I1  .11  .09  .73  .72  .7 1  .27  .28  .29 
...  .29  .29  ...  .71  .7 1  ...  .ll  .12  ...  .72  .7 1  ...  .28  .29 
"sL  = UQ  where L = labor compensation  (real), Q = value added (real). 
bs,,  = 1 -  sL. 
"s,  = K(r + d)lQ  where K = capital stock (real), r = real cost of funds 10 percent, and d = depreciation rate 10 percent. 
Total cost = L + K(r + d). 
'sL = U[L  + K(r + 41. 
%K(r + d)l[L  + K(r + 41. 409  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
R&D.33  Note that, using the more appropriate rental cost of capital, the shares 
of labor and physical capital sum to more than one in France, implying a nega- 
tive return to intangible capital, whereas the sum of these shares is 52 percent 
or lower in all the other countries. 
Table 13.14 reports estimates of  total factor productivity growth for 1975- 
90, with alternative factor share proxies for output elasticities. The results are 
very sensitive to the price deflator and, to a lesser extent, to the estimates of 
output elasticity. Using the GDP deflator for value added, TFP growth in 
France is lower than in total manufacturing in France and much lower than 
pharmaceuticals in the United States or the United Kingdom. In other coun- 
tries, TFP growth is higher in pharmaceuticals than in total man~facturing.~~ 
Using the PPI-drugs estimates of  value added reverses the conclusions for 
France and the United States. 
13.6  Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated some of the problems in estimating productiv- 
ity growth and cross-national comparisons for an industry such as pharmaceu- 
ticals, which has a high rate of  investment in R&D that is subject to cross- 
national diffusion, hence large stocks of unmeasured, intangible capital and a 
high rate of technological change. In addition, the pharmaceutical industry is 
subject to price regulation and safety and efficacy regulation; as a result, prices 
and product mix differ significantly across countries. Country-specific rates of 
price change, as measured by  either the official PPI-drugs or our Divisia in- 
dexes, diverge significantly from economywide inflation. These two drugs- 
specific price indexes are more similar to each other than either is to the GDP 
deflator; however, they differ by  enough to make estimates of  productivity 
growth extremely tentative. The divergence of  pharmaceutical prices cross- 
nationally means that the GDP PPPs do not provide an accurate basis for cross- 
national productivity comparisons. The drugs-specific Fisher price indexes 
used here are more accurate but are also imperfect. 
Because of these measurement problems, conclusions on the cross-national 
comparisons are tentative. The evidence is generally consistent with the hy- 
pothesis that labor productivity is lower in the French pharmaceutical industry 
than in the French manufacturing sector generally, as predicted by the theory 
that biased regulation leads to excessive input use and suboptimal productivity. 
The relatively large market share of local drugs, which may have lower produc- 
tivity than global drugs, may be a contributing factor. For the United Kingdom, 
although capital investment has been very rapid, TFP growth in pharmaceuti- 
33. Cocks (1974) estimates that sL = 0.6 and sK = 0.4 for a single U.S.  firm  for the period 
1967-71,  before adjusting for R&D; these are both revised to 0.5 after netting out labor that is 
devoted to R&D. 
34. Unfortunately, TFP estimates are not available for Italy because data on labor compensation 
and capital are unavailable. Table 13.14  Growth in Value Added, Number Employed, Capital Stock, and Total Factor Productivity (percentage changes) 
% Change in Total Factor Productivity 
Value-Added-Based Shares 
Value Added  Number Employed  Capital Stock  With sKIS  With sXp  Cost-Based Shares 
























-  1.6 
17.2 
8.4  -9.7 
17.4  -8.0 
17.3  3.9 
36.6  3.9 
11.6  -4.6 
11.5  1.3 
21.9  2.9 
24.9  2.9 
5.7  -1.7 
20.0  -11.8 
10.0  -1.5 













1.4  5.5 
3.0  3.2 
80.1  28.3 
...  28.3 
4.4  8.5 
-  .9  5.6 
1.3  6.6 
...  6.6 
-  .5  -4.1 
-20.6  -17.9 
... 










12.8  2.2  13.2 
17.3  -1.6  18.0 
10.1  2.6  6.5 
25.6  ...  21.6 
8.0  1.6  8.9 
5.2  2.1  6.5 
15.6  11.1  18.2 
18.6  ...  21.2 
11.0  3.9  10.6 
25.6  23.0  29.0 
...  ...  .. 
2.6  13.6 
-.8  18.3 
4.1  7.7 
...  26.9 
1.9  8.5 
1.9  5.0 
10.3  15.9 
...  18.9 
4.1  11.1 
15.3  27.5 
.. United Kingdom 
Total manufacturing 
Chemical products 





Drugs & medicines 
PPI-drugs 
-  12.5  13.1 
-8.7  26.2 
15.3  40.8 
...  62.1 
-2.3  7.1 
7.6  19.8 
19.4  37.6 
...  13.2 
-20.7 















-3.8  1.1 
-4.6  .2 
18.2  25.3 
...  25.3 
7.0  .6 
1.7  -5.8 
15.1  19.3 
...  19.3 
4.4  17.6  4.5  17.6 
5.5  27.1  6.2  27.1 
4.3  22.4  12.2  33.8 
...  42.8  ...  55.9 
-1.1  6.6  -.7  6.7 
7.4  20.6  7.4  19.8 
7.8  21.7  16.9  34.4 
...  2.1  ...  9.4 
4.0  17.6 
4.1  27.0 
9.8  28.0 
..  49.3 
-  .6  6.7 
7.4  19.9 
13.2  28.3 
..  3.9 
Nore: Percentage changes for 1976-85  are between the mean values for the two five-year periods 1976-80  and 1981-85.  Percentage changes for 197690 are between the mean values for 
the two five-year periods 1981-85  and 1985-90. 
'sXI = 1 -  sL,  where sL = UQ,  where L = labor compensation (real), Q = value added (real). 
's,  = K(r + dYQ, where K = capital stock (real), r = real cost of  funds 10 percent, and d = depreciation rate 10 percent. 412  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
cals is as high as in the United States and higher than in other manufacturing 
in the United Kingdom. Value  added per employee, relative to the United 
States, is higher for pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom than for other 
manufacturing. One plausible explanation is that rate-of-return regulation in 
the United Kingdom has permitted high returns to R&D investments and that 
any tendency for excessive investment has therefore been in more productive 
forms of capital. 
Appendix A 
Data Sources and Dejinitions 
The primary source for this analysis is the OECD’s 1994 Structural Analysis 
(STAN) industrial database. STAN draws on the OECD’s Industrial Structure 
Statistics (ISIS) and four other databases, using national accounts-compatible 
data where available, supplemented by  other industrial surveys. For the four- 
digit drugs and medicines category, the data for most countries are from indus- 
trial surveys, so strict comparability across countries is not assured. The R&D 
data from national trade associations may also not be strictly comparable. 
Variable Definitions 
Production.  National  accounts-compatible  production  (gross  output), at 
producer prices, excluding VAT. 
Value added. Gross output, less the cost of materials, fuels, electricity, and 
other supplies, contract and commission repair, and maintenance work done 
by others. 
Exports. From the OECD’s Compatible Trade and  Production database, 
which contains flows by ISIC revision 2 category. It has been converted from 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) using a converter devel- 
oped by the OECD. These trade data are compatible across countries but may 
not be strictly comparable to trade flows published in other sources. Values 
f.0.b. 
Imports. See exports. Values c.i.f. 
Employees (number engaged). Annual average number of workers, full-time 
and part-time, including employees, self-employed,  owner-proprietors,  and un- 
paid family members. For France, data are from SNIP. The SNIP definition of 
the industry probably leads to downwardly biased counts of employees, com- 
pared to the STAN measures of production. 
Grossfied capital  formation. National accounts-compatible gross fixed cap- 
ital formation (land, buildings, machinery, and equipment). No data are re- 
ported for Italy for drugs and medicines. 
Labor compensation. National accounts+ompatible  labor costs, including 
wages  and employers’ compulsory contributions to pension, medical care, 413  Price Regulation and Productivity in Pharmaceuticals 
etc. This presumably omits voluntary employer contributions to pensions and 
health insurance in the United States and tax-financed medical care in  the 
United Kingdom. 
Research and development expenditures. National trade associations, as re- 
ported by Centre for Medicines Research (1993). 
Appendix B 
Pharmaceutical Price Indexes 
Fisher Index of Cross-National Price Differences 
The methodology used to construct the Fisher indexes is described in Dan- 
zon and Kim (1998). Although that study pertains to cardiovascular drugs only, 
the same methods are applied to all therapeutic categories for the indexes used 
here. The indexes include all single-molecule drugs that are available in phar- 
macies in both the United  States and the other country under comparison. 
Products are designated as matching across countries if  they have the same 
active ingredient (molecule) and are in the same therapeutic category. 
For each pair of countries, we computed four indexes: using U.S. quantity 
weights and foreign quantity weights and using price per gram of active ingre- 
dient and price per standard unit (a tablet or capsule etc.) as the unit of mea- 
surement. For each pricing measure-per  gram or per  standard unit-the 
Fisher indexes are the geometric mean of the indexes based on U.S. and for- 
eign weights. Here, we use the arithmetic average of these two Fisher indexes. 
The Fisher index is transitive and has other desirable theoretical properties 
(Diewert 1981). 
Although these indexes provide a more accurate measure of relative prices 
than GDP PPPs, they are not perfect measures of pharmaceutical prices for 
several reasons. First, the price data for the United States overstate true transac- 
tions prices to manufacturers owing to omission of discounts and rebates, par- 
ticularly in the most recent years. Second, because the cross-national indexes 
necessarily include only products that are available in both of the two coun- 
tries, this may introduce bias if prices for these matching, global drugs are not 
representative of all drug prices. To the extent that regulation is biased against 
the global products that are included, either because they are produced dispro- 
portionately by foreign firms or because they have high potential prices or vol- 
umes, these indexes based only on matching products may understate overall 
price levels in countries with price regulation. If so, use of these indexes will 
lead to upwardly biased estimates of the U.S. dollar value of production in 
price-regulated countries.35 
35. We  use weights based on the sample included in the indexes rather than reweighting to 
reflect shares in overall drug consumption (van Ark and Pilat 1993). Such reweighting implicitly 
assumes that included products  are representative of  all products,  which may  not be true for 414  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
Divisia Price Indexes 
The methodology used to construct the country-specific Divisia indexes is 
described in Danzon and Kim (1996). The sample includes all single-molecule 
drugs sold through retail pharmacies. The unit of observation is the standard 
unit for the molecule. Chained weights permit the incorporation of new com- 
pounds in their second year on the market. Line extensions and generic forms 
of  existing molecules are incorporated in their first year on the market. The 
indexes for the United States are upwardly biased to the extent that discounts 
and rebates, which are omitted, have become more prevalent over time. 
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Comment  Ernst R. Berndt 
Over the last few years, Patricia Danzon has contributed significantly to our 
empirical understanding of  intercountry price comparisons for prescription 
pharmaceuticals and of the difficulties in interpreting differentials. In this pa- 
per, Danzon and Percy extend this price research in a different direction- 
analyzing the effects of differential price regulation among countries on the 
productivity of domestic pharmaceutical operations. 
There are a great deal, indeed, almost an overabundance, of empirical find- 
ings in this paper; the paper includes, for example, fourteen tables summariz- 
ing detailed calculations. This is also an ambitious paper for it falls in between 
two traditional genres of  international comparison studies-one  very aggre- 
gated at perhaps the national or sectoral level and the other much more de- 
tailed, almost at the case-study level of specificity. Danzon and Percy pursue a 
middle ground, conducting an international comparison of the pharmaceutical 
industry among five countries: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
Drawing on the theory of regulation, Danzon and Percy structure their paper 
by outlining hypotheses that are then examined empirically. Specifically, Dan- 
zon and Percy hypothesize that price regulation biases upward levels of labor 
intensity (reduces average labor productivity), that price regulation also biases 
upward levels of capital intensity (reduces average capital productivity), and 
therefore that price regulation reduces levels of multifactor (capital and labor) 
productivity (MFP). Whether price regulation has a differential effect on capi- 
tal than on labor is also considered; to the extent that the United Kingdom has 
price regulation that is more like traditional rate-of-return regulation, Danzon 
and Percy conjecture and find some evidence tending to suggest that the U.K. 
productivity is more capital biased than labor biased. Finally, although Danzon 
and Percy are somewhat silent on this, their hypotheses and expectations ap- 
pear to refer more to levels of productivity than to their growth rates. 
The data used in this paper come from several sources. Aggregate employ- 
ment, capital formation, and revenue data are taken from OECD-STAN (which 
Ernst R. Berndt is professor of applied economics at the Sloan School of Management, Massa- 
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may not be consistent with national income and product account data), as are 
aggregate GDP PPP data series; country-specific aggregate producer price 
indexes for pharmaceuticals are also drawn from OECD sources. However, 
Danzon and Percy have also undertaken a painstaking set of calculations to 
compute bilateral price comparisons for literally thousands of drugs (chem- 
ical compounds, not just brands) that are sold in both countries, for each pair of 
bilateral comparisons. This research has been reported on elsewhere. Finally, 
Danzon and Percy also address a difficult problem with U.S. data concerning 
offshore manufacturing in Puerto Rico. 
Danzon and Percy find reasonable support for their hypotheses involving 
productivity levels for  labor  and  capital, but  the  multifactor productivity 
(MFP) results, both in level and in growth-rate form, are much more ambigu- 
ous and in particular are found to depend critically on the choice of deflator. 
In attempting to interpret Danzon and Percy’s findings, I would have found 
it useful had the paper contained a bit more discussion on three questions; 
these questions may have been addressed in other papers by Danzon. 
First, what types of drug medications are produced in the five countries, and 
how does this composition vary among countries? What it is that constitutes a 
prescription drug, and what an over-the-counter product, can vary considerably 
across countries, except perhaps for psychotropic drugs. Do the countries dif- 
fer in the relative proportions of patent protected and generic drugs, or what 
variations are there in “world” and primarily local drugs? Is there a systematic 
difference in the proportion of  herbal and homeopathic medications (more 
prevalent in Germany and the United Kingdom)? Finally, do pharmaceutical 
operations differ considerably among the five countries in terms of manufac- 
turing and (re)packaging? Although some of these issues are briefly noted, I 
would have found it helpful to have found a greater discussion of these issues 
as background to interpreting the observed productivity differentials. 
Second, concerning the aggregate employment, capital formation, and reve- 
nue data by country, it is my impression that such data derive ultimately from 
establishment data and that what constitutes an establishment may differ across 
countries. In particular, in the United States, the establishment data taken from 
annual surveys of manufacturing refer only to production and manufacturing 
activities, not to central administrative and office (CAO) personnel. For the 
U.S.  pharmaceutical industry, which is both research and development (R&D) 
and marketing intensive, the possible exclusion of CAO employees may have 
a critical effect on labor productivity findings. For example, how one interprets 
Danzon and Percy’s finding that the average number of employees per estab- 
lishment is about half as large in the United States as in France depends on 
what constitutes an establishment. 
Third, some information on the size distribution of firms or establishments 
would also have been useful. Is the size distribution much more skewed in the 
United Kingdom and Italy than in the United States and France? How different 
are means from medians? 
Let me now turn to some more specific comments. As always, MFP calcula- 418  Patricia M. Danzon and Allison Percy 
tions depend on estimates of capital and labor shares. Danzon and Percy find 
substantial differences in MFF’ growth depending on whether one calculates 
the capital cost share using a residual property income notion or a measure of 
capital expenditures dependent on a rental price of capital. 
Given that the MFP results are somewhat ambiguous and fragile, we might 
ask what else we know about manufacturing efficiency in the pharmaceutical 
industry. An MIT colleague in chemical engineering, Charles Cooney, has re- 
cently published results of  a benchmarking study comparing manufacturing 
operations  of  pharmaceutical and  biotech  firms  in  several  countries  (see 
Cooney and Raju 1996). Cooney and Raju find significant variations among 
firms and countries, with one of  the most significant sources of  differences 
being practices involving inventories of chemical materials-while  some firms 
follow “just-in-time” protocols, a surprising number instead appeared to fol- 
low the less efficient “just-in-case” practice. Unfortunately, Cooney and Raju 
cannot reveal the identities of the establishments and the countries in which 
they operate owing to confidentiality restrictions. 
How else might one think of interpreting the productivity of pharmaceutical 
firms in various countries? One possible way is to compare them on the basis 
of the extent to which their products have worldwide markets or, related, on 
the basis of  successful patent applications. While such comparisons could be 
informative, one should remember that, even within the United States, there 
are some very successful (in terms of stock price growth) pharmaceutical firms 
who have had few innovative new  products. There are a variety of  ways in 
which one might want to envisage productivity, and they could well be quite 
inconsistent with one another. 
In summary, this paper brings into sharp focus the notions that international 
comparisons are quite difficult and are likely to render somewhat inconclusive 
findings when not all major differences can be properly taken into account. In 
the present context, Danzon and Percy are surely correct in noting that differ- 
ences in R&D among countries could have a significant effect on the interpre- 
tation of their results. It would be interesting to see if related problems emerge 
when other industries are compared across countries, such as the telecommuni- 
cations industry, which also has very high sunk costs and relatively small mar- 
ginal costs. 
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